We demonstrate experimentally the feasibility of a two-state quantum bit commitment protocol, which is both concealing and partially binding, assuming technological limitations. The security of this protocol is based on the lack of long-term stable quantum memories. We use a polarization-encoding scheme and optical fiber as a quantum channel. The measurement probability for the commitment is obtained and the optimal cheating strategy demonstrated. The average success rates for an honest player in the case where the measurements are performed using equal bases are 93.4%, when the rectilinear basis is measured, and 96.7%, when the diagonal basis is measured. The rates for the case when the measurements are performed in different bases are 52.9%, when the rectilinear basis is measured, and 55.4% when the diagonal basis is measured. The average success rates for the optimal cheating strategy are 80% and 73.8%, which are way below the success rates of an honest player. Using a strict numerical validity criterion, we show that, for these experimental values, the protocol is secure.
Introduction
Recently, there has been a strong effort to develop quantum primitives, which are designed to change classical cryptographic protocols to their quantum generalizations. One group of these primitives are quantum-based two-party computation protocols, such as the bit commitment (BC) scheme. We demonstrate the practical feasibility of a two-state quantum-bit commitment (QBC) scheme [24] based on the B92 [4] cryptographic protocol, making use of technological limitations.
Regarding current trends in cryptography and information security, QBC is believed to have higher potential than BC [39] . Unfortunately, not even the laws of quantum mechanics allow us to realize all desirable cryptographic functionalities without further assumptions. One of the most noticeable results showed that non-relativistic QBC cannot be unconditionally secure, due to the EPR attack [23, 28] . Since then, the scientific work on QBC has been divided into theoretical and experimental. Regarding theoretical work, most attempts have been focused on evading the no-go theorem [3] . One of the first attempts extended its proof to cover ideal quantum coin tossing [22] . More complicated examples on how to apply the no-go proof to break some quantum as well as classical BC protocols which looked promising at that time were provided in [6] . Reference [34] further studied the security bounds of QBC quantitatively. Recent efforts proved the no-go theorem with alternative methods [8, 20] . Although some results are obtained in favor of QBC, until now the no-go theorem has been well-accepted in quantum cryptographic community and there has been an effort to build a secure QBC under various settings [7, 18] . These impossibility results rule out the ability to build perfect cryptographic primitives. However, it could be possible to build QBC which is almost perfect. Aharonov first showed how to construct imperfect QBC with cheating probabilities smaller than 0.9143 [1] . The best protocol was due to Ambainis who constructed a QBC scheme (and a quantum coin flipping protocol) where no player can cheat with probability greater than 3/4 [2] . Since all implementations suffer from noise, several proposals for secure bit commitment under the noisy-storage model were presented [19, 32, 36, 37] , being also demonstrated experimentally [29] . The practical security of QBC assuming technological limitations was also presented in [11] (security against a quantum memoryless adversary was already pointed out in the original BB84 paper [5] ). However, by joining quantum mechanics and relativity, it was demonstrated to be possible to create an unconditionally secure QBC protocol based on the exchange of quantum and classical information [17, 18] , which was proved to be secure against quantum adversaries [9, 16] . This protocol was already implemented [21, 25] . An information-theoretically secure commitment scheme based on [33] and allowing long commitment times was recently implemented [26] . Even if they are unconditionally secure, relativistic protocols are also difficult to implement. Based on the work from [11] , a practical two-state QBC protocol, along with noise and measurement errors calculations, was recently proposed [24] .
We present an experimental implementation of the two-state QBC protocol proposed in [24] . An overview of the protocol considerations along with the noise analysis is presented, as well as its experimental implementation. Our experimental work is performed using optical fibers, and the encoding of qubits uses photon polarization. The security of the protocol is based on the lack of long-term stable quantum memories. Provided this technological limitation, the security of the protocol is based on the laws of quantum mechanics and not on mathematical hardness conjectures, which are the basis of all asymmetric classical cryptographic schemes (a generic advantage quantum cryptography has over classical, shown already by the pioneering key distribution protocols of Bennet and Brassard [4, 5] ). This paper contains five sections. In Section 2, we present the protocol definition along with the associated measurement probabilities. In Section 3, we show the experimental setup and discuss the results. In Section 4 we analyse the protocol's security against cheating attempts. Section 5 discusses the main conclusions of this work.
Protocol's Definition
QBC is a two-party protocol which allows Bob to know about Alice's commitment. The protocol is binding, i.e., Alice cannot change her commitment after the commitment phase, and concealing, i.e., Bob cannot learn Alice's commitment before the opening phase. In practice, QBC allows to solve trust issues when people are not close to each other. In this section we present the protocol steps, along with the underlying theory of noisy channels. First, it is important to notice that in this protocol it is Alice who makes the commitment (as in the classical BC), while Bob is initializing the protocol by sending individual photons (contrary to the classical BC, where Alice is sending classical bits).
It is emphasized that the qubit states |0 and |1 used in the protocol are not orthogonal. Indeed, we choose states such that 0|1 = cos(π/4). The states orthogonal to |0 and |1 are denoted by |0 ⊥ and |1 ⊥ , respectively, so that 0 ⊥ |0 = 0 and 1 ⊥ |1 = 0. In that way, we defined two orthonormal bases B 0 = {|0 , |0 ⊥ } and B 1 = {|1 , |1 ⊥ }, which define two orthogonal observables that we callĈ 0 andĈ 1 :Ĉ
For the measurement strategy, Alice is measuring one of the two observables defined in equation (2) (see a detailed discussion below). Since the angle between the two states |0 and |1 , and the respective bases B 0 and B 1 , is π/4, the probability of having a mismatch between the state sent and the measurement outcome is 1/2 [12] . We now turn our attention to factors which contribute to an increased quantum-bit error rate (QBER). We will divide them into two groups. The first group will represent the effects that change the quantum state of a photon -the noise as a consequence of the photon's interaction with the environment and misalignment of the experimental apparatus. Following [14] , we call it the optical noise and model it by a depolarizing channel (see Section IV.A; note that the visibility V from Eq. (34) of [14] and the depolarizing channel parameter p given by Eq. (3) below are related by a simple relation V = 1 − p). The other group of factors that contribute to the QBER are imperfect single-photon sources, photon-absorption by the environment, finite detector efficiencies and detectors' dark counts. In contrast to the first group, we will refer to these factors as non-optical noise.
The protocol has four phases and runs as follows: There are various schemes that Bob can adopt to validate Alice's commitment. We here take advantage of the simplicity of the protocol and assume Bob uses the following test, known as the binomial test: let p c (r|b), with c, r, b ∈ {0, 1}, denote the conditional probability that Alice obtains result r when measuring observableĈ c on state |b . All these can be easily computed or estimated by Bob before the protocol starts. Let n(r|b) be the number of r's measured by Alice whenever state |b was sent, and define q(r|b) = n(r|b) n(b) . Then the sets {q(r|0)} r∈{0,1} and {q(r|1)} r∈{0,1} form sets of statistical data. Without loss of generality, suppose Alice is committing to 0. Let P (q(r|0)||p 0 (0|0)) be the probability that a binomial distribution with probability of success p 0 (0|0) produces the statistics {q(r|0)} r∈{0,1} , and analogously for P (q(r|1)||p 0 (1|1)). To accept Alice's commitment, Bob checks that P (q(r|0)||p 0 (0|0)) > α and that P (q(r|1)||p 0 (1|1)) > α, where α is a threshold probability to be determined by Bob himself. Furthermore, for viability purposes, one must require that if Alice commits to 1, she must be unable to pass the test of committing to 0. As noted in [24] , this requirement is satisfied as long as it is secure against a cheating Alice. In Section 4 we analyze possible choices of the security parameter α and show that the protocol is indeed secure against a cheating Alice.
To analyze the optical part of the noise, we consider a white-noise model given by a depolarizing channel E d with a given probability p, that is:
whereρ is a general mixed state which represents the initial qubit state andÎ is the identity operator. It is worth considering the overall conditional probabilities obtained from each measurement. If by p c (r|b), with c, r, b ∈ {0, 1}, we denote a conditional probability that a result r is obtained when measuring observablê C c on state |b , then the conditional probabilities are given by the following expressions [24] ,
• If Alice measuresĈ 0 :
• If Alice measuresĈ 1 :
Let n c (r|b), with c, r, b ∈ {0, 1}, be the number of results r when measuring observableĈ c on state |b , and n c (b) the total number of detected photons sent in the state |b , when measuringĈ c . If Alice is honest, i.e., if she indeed measures only one out of the two commitment observablesĈ c on all qubits received from Bob, the statistics of her measurements will, due to the law of large numbers, approach the corresponding conditional probabilities in equations (4) and (8) . Thus
, and analogously for other cases. We see that the first two expressions from equation (4) represent the optical contribution (opt) for the success (SRATE) and the quantum-bit error rates (QBER), respectively, obtained when measuring observableĈ 0 on state |0 (and analogously for the last two expressions of equation (8)). Therefore, if the statistics of Alice's measurements approach equation (4), Bob accepts a commitment to 0; if they approach equation (8), Bob accepts a commitment to 1; otherwise Bob aborts the protocol. Note that up to this point we discussed only the so-called optical errors, due to external noise occurring during the emission, transmission and measurement of photons.
As mentioned, the aim of the protocol is to be both binding and concealing. It is also worth mentioning that (in spite of recent efforts [27, 31] ), long-term storage of photons is not going to be feasible in a foreseeable future. Therefore, Alice is forced to perform measurements as the photons arrive: she cannot postpone her commitment until after the commitment phase. Since an ideal single-photon source is very difficult to obtain, Bob is forced to use weak pulses to prevent the well-known splitting attack; the sending pulse rate should be chosen in a way such that the emission rate of multi-photons is much smaller than the emission rate of single photons. When several photons are emitted, all photons are in the same pure state of polarization. Otherwise, Alice could split two and measureĈ 0 on one photon, andĈ 1 on another. This way she could have results consistent with both commitments (and could thus postpone her decision). We also make the basic assumption that Bob does not have access to Alice's laboratory and since she is revealing her commitment only during the opening phase, Bob does not get any knowledge about Alice's measurement before that phase. Therefore, since after the completion of the Initialization phase there is no information exchange between the two parties until the start of the Opening phase, the protocol is concealing. Regarding Alice's measurements, one can also discuss her optimal cheating strategy for single-photon measurements. The optimal cheating observable is the observable "between"Ĉ 0 andĈ 1 , i.e., it is observable whose eigenbasis is rotated by -π/8 from B 0 (for the analysis of optimal cheating strategies in the context of quantum cryptography, see for example [10, 13, 34, 38] ). The cheating observableĈ ch is defined by mutually orthogonal vectors, |0 and |1 , such that the angle between |0 and |0 , and the angle between |1 and |1 is π/8,
If Alice obtains the result 0 (corresponding to vector |0 ), she infers that the state sent by Bob is |0 . When we obtain the result 1 (corresponding to state |1 ), we infer that the state sent by Bob is |1 . In the ideal case, the conditional probabilities for the cheating observable are written as,
In this case, the success rate is the probability to infer 0 when the state sent by Bob was |0 , and the same for the case when the state sent by Bob was |1 . Since the situation is symmetric, the two probabilities are the same. In terms of probabilities, SRATE opt ch and the QBER opt ch are written as:
If the error induced by noise produces the error for an honest player (Alice) identical to the error of a cheating player, then the two strategies (honest and cheating) are indistinguishable, and the protocol cannot be performed. Thus, the honest player error rate QBER opt ch must be smaller than that of a cheating player, which is ≈ 15 %.
Experimental Implementation
In this section we present the experimental setup used to implement the twostate QBC protocol, the corresponding experimental results and their analysis.
Experimental Setup
The scheme of the experimental setup that we have used is presented in Fig. 1 . On Bob's side, a pump at λ p = 1550.92 nm from a tunable laser source passes through a polarization controller (PC-1) and is externally modulated using a Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM) to produce optical pulses with a fullwidth at half maximum of approximately 1 ns, and a repetition rate of 100 kHz. The pulse goes into a 50/50 beam splitter, and two acousto-optic modulators (AOM-1 and AOM-2) will work as a switch. The PC-2 and PC-3 are used to adjust the polarizations of the photons in the lower and upper arms, respectively. The axis of the linear polarizer LP-1 is set at 0
• , preparing the |0 polarization state. Analogously, the axis of the linear polarizer LP-2 is set at 45
• , preparing the |1 polarization state. Next, photons pass through a 50/50 beam coupler and are attenuated using a variable optical attenuator (VOA), obtaining an average number µ ≈ 0.2 of photons per pulse, (such as in [14] ), thus decreasing the probability to have beam-splitter attacks. Then, they reach an optical fiber (single-mode fiber with an attenuation coefficient, α ≈ 0.2 dB/km) that works as a quantum channel.
At the receiving side, Alice can choose the commitment basis by setting a half-wave plate (λ/2, with λ being the wavelength of the wave) to 2θ = 0
• , 45
• , or -22.5
• , and uses a polarization-beam splitter (PBS) to discriminate between 0
• and 90
• . The PC-4 is used to compensate random rotations of polarization in the quantum channel. Regarding Alice's commitment, if the wave plate is set at 2θ = 0
• it means Alice choosesĈ 0 , if it is set at 2θ = 45
• it means Alice chooseŝ C 1 , and if it is set at 2θ = −22.5
• it means Alice choosesĈ ch . The photons are detected using two avalanche photodiodes (D0 and D1) [30] . D0 (id200) has a dark count probability per time gate, t g = 5 ns, of P 0 dc = 3×10 −5 , and a quantum detection efficiency η 0 ≈ 7%. D1 (id201) has a dark count probability per time gate, t g = 5 ns, of P 1 dc = 6×10 −5 , and a quantum detection efficiency η 1 ≈ 9%. A synchronization pulse at λ s = 1547.72 nm from a distributed feedback laser is used to trigger the detectors, where a switch allows to send pulses with the same repetition rate of the encoded photons. These pulses are detected using a photodiode detector (PIN), which is connected to both detectors. In the synchronization channel, an optical fiber is used with the same length as the quantum channel in order to allow synchronization between Bob and Alice's measurement devices.
Experimental Results
To demonstrate the feasibility of the experimental setup shown in Fig. 1 , we have performed measurements of bothĈ 0 andĈ 1 . The rates obtained by Alice when the basis of her measurement observableĈ c (with c ∈ {0, 1}) coincides with the basis B b (with b ∈ {0, 1}) from which the state was prepared by Bob ("measurements in equal bases"), as well as when they are different ("measurements in different bases"), are plotted for both cases. The sequence of bits to encode was given by a pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) with 2 17 bits. In a single run we sent the full sequence of bits and recorded the results. In Fig. 2 we show the measurement results obtained when Alice and Bob had a quantum channel of 16 km between them, for bothĈ 0 andĈ 1 as a function of the run. A run means that Bob sent a pattern with the 2 17 bits through the system and Alice have performed the measurements.
From the experimental results obtained, we can infer several conclusions. First, we notice that the success rates for the case when the measurements are performed using equal bases are always higher than 90%, which is above the minimum theoretical security limit. The average success rate is 93.4 % when C 0 is measured and 96.7 % whenĈ 1 is measured. Second, the rates for the case when the measurements are performed in different bases are always close to 50%, as expected. In this case, the average success rate is 52.9 % whenĈ 0 is measured and 55.4 % whenĈ 1 is measured. The results are according to theory, since in the ideal case, when the measurements are performed in equal bases, the success rate should be 100%. For measurements in different bases, in the ideal case the rate should be 50%, since the probability to detect a photon is the same for D0 or D1. As described in equations (4) and (8) , in the realistic case of noisy channels the alignment between Bob and Alice is not perfect, which will lead to wrong detections, and consequently to a rate lower than 100%, or different from 50%, depending if we are talking about measurements in equal bases or different bases, respectively.
The SRATEs and QBERs are a consequence of both optical (depolarizing channel) and non-optical noises (imperfect single-photon sources, photon absorption by the environment, finite detector efficiency and dark counts). Thus,
with i = 0, 1. Theoretically, the non-optical QBER can be written as,
where µ is the average number of photons per pulse and t link = 10 (−αL/10) , with L being the fiber length (see equations. (31)- (33) in [14] , page 166).
The optical noise is given by equations (4) and (8) from Section 2 and plays an important role in the results. The non-optical noise does not depend on the state emitted by the source (Bob's apparatus) nor the observable measured by Alice, but it does depend on the result obtained. However it is worth mentioning that both detectors have different detection efficiencies (η 0 ≈ 7% for D0 and η 1 ≈ 9% for D1) and their dark count probabilities per time gate are also different (P 0 dc = 3×10 −5 for D0 and P 1 dc = 6×10 −5 for D1). Using equations (4), (8) and (23), equation (22) can be rewritten as,
which includes both optical and non-optical contributions. (24), where p 0 = 7.1 × 10 −2 and p 1 = 1 × 10 −3 were used as fitting parameters. The error bars represent the standard deviation of the experimental values. The correlation coefficient between experimental and theoretical data was r 2 = 0.77 whenĈ 0 was measured and r 2 = 0.99 whenĈ 1 was measured.
In addition to Fig. 2 , we can plot the measurement results for the average QBER over the number of runs for several fiber lengths, and use the variables p i in equation (24) as fitting parameters, as shown in Fig. 3 . As expected, the QBER increases with the fiber length. The difference between the QBER values in the measurements inĈ 0 andĈ 1 is due to several reasons: different dark count probabilities and quantum efficiencies of the two detectors and different losses in each channel.
Rewriting equation (24) we obtain
From this equation, using the experimental results from Fig. 3 , where each QBER i is the average value of 5 runs for each fiber length, we plot the values of p i (L) in Fig. 4 , which show the probability of the occurrence of white noise. In order to check the optimal cheating strategy for Alice, we performed measurements ofĈ ch . The results are shown in Fig. 5 . From this figure it can be seen there's a relatively good agreement between experimental results and theoretical predictions. In Fig. 6 we present the experimental results of the QBER for measurements ofĈ ch for several fiber lengths. We can see that the QBER is a bit higher than the theoretical value, mainly because of the difficulty to set the half-wave plate (λ/2) at exactly 2θ = −22.5
• and the unavoidable optical noise. The differences between measurements of ones and zeros are also due to efficiency and dark counts differences in the two detectors and different losses in each channel. In fact, the same type of error due to bad alignment exists when measuringĈ 0 andĈ 1 , but since it is much easier to align the equipment for those two measurements, we can assume that when measuringĈ 0 andĈ 1 , this type of error is negligible, with respect to the measurement of the cheating observable. The average rates for the optimal cheating strategy were 80% when measuring zeros and 73.8% when measuring ones. 
Security Against a Cheating Alice
In this Section we analyse the security of the protocol against the above described cheating Alice. First, we use the experimental results for Alice's measurements of observablesĈ 0 andĈ 1 to calibrate the equipment, i.e., to establish Bob's precise quantitative validity criterion. Then, we show that the experimentally obtained results of a cheating Alice would not pass such criterion, showing that the protocol is secure. First, we describe how Bob forms the viability criterion introduced in Section 2. The probability that an honest Alice obtains n 0 times the value 0 when measuring N 0 particles in state |0 is given by a binomial distribution with mean value
and variance
Since, for sufficiently large N 0 , this binomial distribution behaves like a normal distribution with the same parameters, the binomial test described in Section 2 reduces to the well-known 68 − 95 − 99.7 rule of thumb, for significance levels of 32%, 5% and 0.3%, respectively. For a significance level of 0.3%, Bob accepts Alice's statistics for whenever |0 was sent if
which will henceforth be called the "3σ security criterion". This ensures that if an honest Alice is committing to 0, then she has ≈ 99.7% chance of having the first part of her data set accepted by Bob as a valid commitment. In terms of the security parameter α introduced in Section 2, this corresponds to setting
Analogously, Bob now proceeds to test the second portion of Alice's statistics, those when state |1 was sent, and accepts them if
Finally, Bob validates Alice's commitment as a whole if both conditions (28) and (30) are satisfied. For the "3σ security criterion", the protocol will fail to accept an honest Alice's commitment around 6 times every thousand runs. Concretely, Fig. 2 represents the measured conditional probabilities p 0 (r|b), when taking into account both optical and non-optical errors. The exact values are given by
In this case, given that in each run of the protocol there were on average about Note that such a low allowance for statistical error shows that, in a reallife implementation, one can use far less photon pulses than those used here: 2 17 ≈ 130000. Indeed, in [24] , Section V, it was shown that to guarantee a 3 standard-deviation allowance, it is enough to have around N 0 ≈ N 1 ≈ 50 measurement outcomes, which corresponds to about 2 13 ≈ 8000 photon pulses. In fact, the above optimal probability to cheat for single-qubit measurements decreases exponentially with respect to the number of photons (see for example Theorem 4 of [35] ), i.e. it is given by a negligible function (a function ε : N → R is said to be negligible if for every positive polynomial p there exists a n 0 ∈ N such that for all n > n 0 , ε(n) ≤ 1/p(n), see for example [15] ).
It is interesting to note that even having perfect detectors (with perfect efficiency and no dark counts) cannot help a cheating Alice. Note that perfect detectors will only improve the results ofĈ 0 andĈ 1 measurements used to establish Bob's numerical verification criterion, reducing them to the case of optical noise only, given by equations (4) and (8) . In other words, Bob's verification criterion will be even tighter than in the case of non-ideal detectors. While the perfect detectors will also improve the chances of a cheating Alice, it will not be enough to significantly compromise the protocol's security. Indeed, assuming the "noisy" verification criterion given by equation (28) , for the experimental values given by equations (31) and (35) and perfect cheating statistics given by equation (2), the protocol's security significance level is still of the order of 10 −8 , which corresponds to a "6σ security criterion" (i.e., even a cheating Alice with exceptional access to perfect technology is successful only once in around every 100 million runs).
A general theoretical discussion of the protocol's security and viability was presented in [24] , where it was shown that if the protocol is secure against a cheating Alice, then it is also viable: an honest Alice trying to commit to 1 can never pass the test of committing to 0.
Conclusions
We have implemented a two-state quantum bit commitment protocol in optical fibers. The encoding of qubits was performed using two nonorthogonal states of polarization. We were able to implement the protocol even when photons travel through an optical fiber with several kilometers in length. We also presented results obtained for the optimal cheating strategy for Alice, showing good agreement with the theory. We noticed that the success rates for the case when the measurements were performed using equal bases were always higher than 90%. The rates for the case when the measurements were performed in different bases were always close to 50%. In this case, the average success rate was 52.9 % whenĈ 0 was measured and 55.4 % whenĈ 1 was measured. When measuring the observable for the optimal cheating strategy the average success rates were 80% when measuring zeros and 73.8% when measuring ones. We presented a detailed numerical validity criterion for Bob to either accept or reject Alice's commitment, and showed that, with the above mentioned experimental rates, the protocol is secure against cheating attempts.
Finally, we note that although we presented the experimental implementation of a two-state protocol, with the necessary adjustments it can be converted to a four-state protocol. Note that in this case Bob's criterion would be split into 4 different conditions similar to Eqs. (28) and (30), thus making it harder for a cheating Alice to succeed. In general, the more states there are, the less photons are needed in each run of the protocol to ensure a given level of security. A rigorous theoretical analysis of the dependence of the level of security with respect to the number of photons used can be done by following the arguments in Reference [24] , which can be straightforwardly adapted to the 4-state protocol.
